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is broad in scope, it is not an unlimited power. It may not transcend
constitutional limitations.
"A reasonable exercise of the police power is one required by
public necessity, and a public necessity is the legitimate exercise
of its power." 6 McQmLLN, MUNICIPAL COPxORATONS § 24.09, 460
(3d ed. 1949).
The court in the principal case, in reaching its decision, relied
on the case of Givner v. State, 210 Md. 484, 124 A.2d 764 (1956),
which held that an ordinance, reciting that inspection was necessary
to combat growth of slum conditions, was not unconstitutional when
the inspections were to be made at reasonable, daylight hours and
were of a routine nature.
However, it would seem that in view of the firmness with which
the right of a man to the privacy of his home has been established,
the better view would be to protect this right in the absence of a
clear necessity for its invasion. As was stated in the Little case,
supra: "If an acute emergency occurs precluding reference to a
court or magistrate, public officials must take such steps as are neces-
sary to protect the public. But, absent such emergency, health laws
are enforced by the police power and are subject to the same con-
stitutional limitations as are other police powers. It is wholly fal-
lacious to say that any particular police power is immune from
constitutional restrictions." At 16. Thus, in balancing the power
of a municipality to protect the health, safety and welfare of its
citizens against the individual's right to the privacy of his home, the
test of reasonableness now appears to be the deciding factor. It is
submitted that considerations of health, safety and welfare of the
community may require that a municipality be permitted to exercise
the police power to its fullest extent. On the other hand, the pri-
vacy of the home has long been considered a most sacred right, one
not to be hastily surrendered or chipped or frittered or worn away
by the edgencies of the times. COOLEY, CoNs'rrrunoNAL LnvimrrA-
TIONS 73 (8th ed. 1927).
A. G. H.
MuNiCIPAL CORPORATIONS-TAXATION-VALDrTY OF LICENSE AND
USE TAxES ON PtBuc Unxxrr.-Upon expiration of P's public utility
franchise for telephone services in a municipality, the utility con-
tinued to use and occupy the city streets for its telephone facilities
and equipment. Five of P's employees were arrested by the munici-
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pality for stringing telephone wires incident to its utility services.
Shortly thereafter the municipality adopted an ordinance imposing
on certain utilities a "service fee" to cover the cost of permanent
injury to the surface of the streets and a "use fee" for the right and
privilege to use and occupy the streets and other public ways of
the municipality for public utility purposes. The "service fee" was
regulatory in nature whereas the "use fee" was apparently for gen-
eral revenue purposes. P, being included within the broad reaches
of the ordinance, sought and obtained an injunction in the circuit
court restraining enforcement of the ordinance primarily on grounds
of its invalidity. On appeal by the municipality, held, that while the
provisions of the ordinance relating to the "service fee" for regu-
latory purposes are valid, the provisions relating to and imposing the
"use fee" are invalid and beyond the powers of the municipality.
Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. City of Morgantown, 105 S.E.2d
260 ( W.Va. 1958).
Primary interest in this comment will be centered on the "use
fee" which the municipality conceded was imposed purely for reve-
nue purposes but justified as a rental charge on the utility for the
portion of the streets occupied by it It will be well, therefore, to
survey briefly the law relating to the powers and authority of a
municipality to impose a "use fee" for general revenue purposes and,
in particular, where the "use fee" is attempted to be justified as a
rental charge for use of the streets.
It is well settled in West Virginia and a majority of jurisdic-
tions that a municipal corporation can exercise only those powers
expressly granted or fairly implied from such an express grant.
Maynard v. Layne, 140 W. Va. 819, 86 S.E.2d 783 (1955). A city
has no inherent power to tax and can do so only when this power
is delegated. Hukie v. City of Huntington, 184 W. Va. 249, 58
S.E.2d 780 (1950). If the city of Morgantown has the right to levy
a "use fee" for revenue purposes, the right is clearly not inherent or
implied. Therefore, the right must be delegated to the city spe-
cifically in its charter or to all cities generally by statute.
In so far as the "use fees" in the principal case is concerned,
no right to levy same is found spelled out specifically in the Mor-
gantown charter and no such power is granted by statute to West
Virginia cities generally. Charter of City of Morgantown, W. Va.
Acts 1983, ch. 126; W. VA. CODE: ch. 8, art. 4, § 18b and ch. 11,
art. 13, § 2b (Michie 1955). Where a city is granted specific
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powers, those not named are withheld. State ex rel. Bibb v.
Chambers, 138 W. Va. 701, 77 S.E.2d 297 (1953). As the power
to levy a "use fee" has not been granted to Morgantown by
statute or by any provision in its charter, it is withheld. In addition,
the imposition of a municipal privilege tax on a public utility is
limited by statute in West Virginia. W. VA. CODE ch. 8, art. 4, § 13b
(Michie 1955). Since the city of Morgantown apparently has no
authority to impose a "use fee" on public utilities as here attempted,
the ordinance relating thereto in the principal case must be invalid
if, in fact, the "use fee be a privilege tax for revenue purposes.
An examination of the tax in the principal case can lead to
no conclusion other than that the tax is a use tax. A use tax
has two requisites: (1) it is levied on the use or consumption of
property, (2) it has no regulatory features and is for revenue only.
State ex. rel. Hansen v. Slater, 190 Wash. 703, 70 P.2d 1056 (1937).
The tax in the principal case is levied on property used by the utility
company within the city, thus satisfying the first requisite of a use
tax. It contains no regulatory or prohibitive features and is appar-
ently for revenue only, thus meeting the second requirement. Dis-
regarding the relatively nebulous label of "use fee" and examining
the tax in substance and form as it is levied, it cannot be reasonably
construed to be anything other than a use tax.
Generally, courts have looked upon use taxes imposed by mu-
nicipal corporations with disfaver and usually have construed ordi-
nances relating thereto in favor of the taxpayer. In some cases
attempts to collect use fees for use of public streets have been
expressly declared to be invalid. City of Chicago Heights v. Public
Service, 408 Ill. 604, 97 N.E.2d 807 (1951).
In Hukle v. City of Huntington, supra, it was held that statutes
delegating power to municipalities to levy taxes must be construed
strictly and, if any doubt exists, it should be resolved in the tax-
payer's favor. The Hukle case also held that a municipal corpora-
tion can exercise only those powers expressly granted to it or essen-
tial to accomplishing the purpose of the corporation. The case em-
phasized that these implied powers must be indispensable, not merely
convenient, before the corporation could exercise them. It ap-
pears obvious, therefore, that the use tax attempted to be imposed
on P in the principal case, in addition to the valid license tax, is
not within any indispensable, implied power of the city of Morgan-
town. A more logical argument would seem to favor a matter of
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mere convenience or a compelling desire for greater revenue. Origi-
nally the tax was levied at $240,000. When the company announced
it would seek to enjoin the enforcement of the ordinance the sched-
ule of payments was changed thereby, reducing the tax to $40,000.
This substantial change strongly indicated an attempt to obtain
additional income for the municipality from the utility under the
guise of an exercise of nonexistent municipal powers.
In contrast to the obvious invalidity of the use tax, the license
tax imposed by the city appears to be valid and wholly consistent
with the charter granted to the city as a municipal corporation. A
license tax to be valid must be incident to regulation and within
the municipal police powers. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Seattle, 291
U. S. 300 (1934). The sections of the ordinance assessing the license
tax clearly meet both requirements as they contain words of regu-
lation and are wholly within the police powers of the city. The tax
contains nothing inconsistent with the city's power to tax or power
to regulate as a municipal corporation.
The principal case is worthy of a more diligent and learned
analysis than has been attempted in this comment for a number of
reasons. It will be of considerable value to West Virginia lawyers
in general and to those who represent municipalities in particular.
The case contains an excellent discussion of the powers of munici-
palities to tax and of the law of municipal corporations in a compre-
hensive, though not overly detailed, opinion. Set out in the case
itself is the challenged city ordinance containing both valid and
invalid tax provisions. This fact facilitates comparison and study of
both the valid and invalid provisions of the ordinance. The case
carefully defines the extent and limits of taxing areas of West Vir-
ginia municipal corporations generally.
While a "judicial inquiry investigates, declares and enforces
liabilities as they stand on present or past facts and under laws
including municipal ordinances, supposed already to exist" and while
legislation, on the other hand, "looks to the future and changes
existing conditions by making a new rule to be applied thereafter",
it may be observed that the judicial inquiry in the principal case has
found restated and established legal principles which will helpfully
serve as survey markers in municipal quests for future revenue
sources. Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 226 (1908).
J. J. P.
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